Plate 03 · Trade
China: from a minor partner to the main one
Each map shows how much of a country's goods trade is with China; the darker the country, the bigger the tie. Between 1995 and 2025 the number of countries doing at least a tenth of their trade with China went from 5 to 120.
Countries doing at least a tenth of their goods trade with China, 1995 to 2025 (of 174 and 208 with data). Peak: 120 in 2025.
Countries where China is the largest trading partner (EU counted as one bloc), 1995 to 2025.
Largest fall in share with China among economies with at least US$ 1 bn of trade: 14% to 8%.
Largest rise in share with China: 1% to 54%.
1995 → 2001 → 2009 → 2017 → 2025
Reach, measured
Share of countries with data that do at least a tenth (10%) of their goods trade with each power. The China line is the story; the others give scale. Dashed lines mark the years mapped above.
Show the numbers behind the chart
| Year | US | China | EU | Russia | Countries with data |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1995 | 41.4% | 2.9% | 78.7% | 9.2% | 174 |
| 1996 | 43.0% | 4.2% | 77.2% | 12.0% | 142 |
| 1997 | 41.0% | 4.5% | 84.2% | 10.1% | 178 |
| 1998 | 42.2% | 3.9% | 88.3% | 9.4% | 180 |
| 1999 | 41.4% | 4.5% | 76.3% | 8.3% | 157 |
| 2000 | 42.2% | 7.3% | 68.1% | 7.8% | 192 |
| 2001 | 41.0% | 6.9% | 72.8% | 7.4% | 188 |
| 2002 | 37.8% | 7.8% | 72.5% | 5.7% | 193 |
| 2003 | 39.2% | 10.8% | 70.8% | 6.7% | 194 |
| 2004 | 39.8% | 13.6% | 73.3% | 7.3% | 191 |
| 2005 | 35.6% | 15.4% | 69.1% | 8.0% | 188 |
| 2006 | 34.7% | 17.1% | 67.7% | 8.3% | 193 |
| 2007 | 31.5% | 19.5% | 66.1% | 7.5% | 200 |
| 2008 | 30.3% | 22.2% | 65.1% | 7.6% | 198 |
| 2009 | 29.9% | 27.8% | 64.3% | 7.2% | 194 |
| 2010 | 27.3% | 28.8% | 61.6% | 7.1% | 198 |
| 2011 | 25.8% | 31.3% | 62.2% | 8.1% | 198 |
| 2012 | 26.5% | 32.7% | 57.1% | 7.1% | 196 |
| 2013 | 24.2% | 33.8% | 61.3% | 6.6% | 198 |
| 2014 | 27.7% | 35.6% | 60.8% | 5.9% | 202 |
| 2015 | 26.0% | 42.5% | 61.5% | 5.0% | 200 |
| 2016 | 28.6% | 42.9% | 64.7% | 4.6% | 196 |
| 2017 | 28.6% | 45.7% | 63.0% | 6.0% | 199 |
| 2018 | 27.2% | 48.7% | 64.5% | 6.2% | 195 |
| 2019 | 26.2% | 49.7% | 60.4% | 5.6% | 195 |
| 2020 | 27.5% | 53.0% | 60.3% | 6.0% | 200 |
| 2021 | 27.7% | 54.0% | 59.7% | 5.9% | 202 |
| 2022 | 26.9% | 51.7% | 57.1% | 4.5% | 201 |
| 2023 | 27.0% | 51.0% | 62.4% | 3.9% | 204 |
| 2024 | 27.6% | 57.6% | 58.8% | 4.9% | 203 |
| 2025 | 27.9% | 57.7% | 58.2% | 4.8% | 208 |
Who moved most, 1995 to 2025
Share of each country's goods trade that is with China. Economies with at least US$ 1 bn of goods trade in both years, 128 countries compared.
Biggest falls
| Country | Then | Now | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yemen | 14% | 8% | −6 pts |
Biggest rises
| Country | Then | Now | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Turkmenistan | 1% | 54% | +54 pts |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 2% | 46% | +45 pts |
| New Caledonia | 1% | 35% | +34 pts |
| Angola | 3% | 36% | +33 pts |
| Guinea | 1% | 33% | +32 pts |
| Iraq | 0% | 31% | +31 pts |
| Ethiopia | 2% | 33% | +31 pts |
| Chile | 2% | 33% | +31 pts |
What this plate does not show
Trade ties are not political loyalty. This plate shows where China became commercially central, not where it controls outcomes.
Method, definitions and known gaps: how this is measured. Every figure on this page is computed from the IMF data when the site is built.